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Risk Criteria for Approving or Rejecting
Field Tests of High-Performance Weapons*
Shaul Feller & Michael Maharik**
Background
Testing any new technological system involves an implicit
understanding: While aiming for success, failure is a legitimate
outcome. Failure, or a whole spectrum of possible failures, should be
taken into account when designing the test from the earliest stages. This
paper discusses the implications for the risk management of modern,
high-performance weapon systems testing. "High-performance" in this
context is the combination of high maneuverability and potential long
range; a guided missile is a typical example.
A primary concern in analyzing potential failures of such systems is
the possible deviation from the pre-designed trajectory. The locus of all
the points that may be reached by a specific weapon system, or its
debris, is referred to as its "kinematic footprint;" a line enclosing this
area is defined as the system's "kinematic envelope." 1 In general, the
area of the target and its close surroundings, the expected impact zone
for a successful flight, are relatively small compared to the kinematic
envelope generated by a given combination of a tested system and its
launch conditions.
If one insists on absolute safety, he or she must allocate a test area
the size of the kinematic footprint and have it totally evacuated. Such a
* The authors are indebted to the late E. Ratzon (1905-1988) for his inspired ideas
and pioneering work in the field of risk assessment in Israel.
** Dr. Feller is the Chief Safety Engineer at RAFAEL, Israel Armament
Development Authority. He received his M.S. and Ph.D. (Physics) from the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem.
Dr. Maharik is the Safety Engineer, Ordnance Systems Division, RAFAEL. He
received his B.S. (Aeronautical Engineering) from the Technion, Israel Institute of
Technology, his M.B.A. from Tel-Aviv University, and his M.S. and Ph.D.
(Engineering and Public Policy) from Carnegie Mellon University.
1 This envelope is dictated by the capabilities of the tested system, which, in turn,
depend on parameters of its propulsion system, aerodynamic configuration, control
and on the launch or release conditions (altitude, velocity, andangtuar orientation).
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policy was tried at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), New Mexico,
in 1947, following an errant missile impact in a graveyard immediately
outside Juarez, Mexico. 2 However, this conservative policy imposed
extreme requirements that could not be met. Abandonment of the
policy of absolute safety was indicated, which meant that imposing a
certain level of risk on the public was unavoidable. As a result,
engineering and probabilistic techniques for weapon-testing risk
assessment, which reduced the evacuation requirement to areas smaller
than those of the kinematic footprints, were later developed.
Figure 1
Size Comparison on Same Scale: White Sands Missile Range, New Jersey & Israel
IsraelWSMR New Jersey (pre-1967)
The need to reserve large ground areas for weapon testing generates
inconvenience even for large countries. For smaller ones, it is a serious
problem. The U.S. has allocated an area of 6107 sq. miles for tests at
WSMR. 3 In contrast, the whole area of the pre-19 6 7 State of Israel
was 8031 and New Jersy is 7836 sq. miles. With such a size, one must
adopt design approaches other than that of "absolute safety" to perform
tests vital to national security.
2 Winton G. Hammond & Roy E. Geisinger, Reducing Safety Constraints
Through Vehicle Design, presented at the American Institute of Aeronautics &
Astronautics Meeting on Launch Operations, Feb. 1970 (Paper 70-248).
3 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, Major Range and Test Facility Base Summary of Capahilities (DoD
3200.11-D, 1983).
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The Israeli Weapon Test and Evaluation Center (WTEC)
"Shdema" is located in the south, and comprises 174 sq. miles of
practically uninhabited desert. Military training areas adjacent to the
test range provide some possibility of enlarging its ground area.
However, the kinematic footprint for missile tests may sometimes be
considerably larger than even that and include military bases, industrial
facilities, and even general population communities.
Thus tests performed at the range may impose risk on these
populations. The risk is involuntary and uncontrollable from the point
of view of the exposed majority. Moreover, they are unaware of the risk
or, at least, details that must be kept classified. In general, people are
known to perceive involuntary, uncontrollable and unknown risks as
higher than risks that have the same exposure levels, but are voluntary,
controllable and known.4 These features add even more dimensions
to the problem addressed by this paper.
The Problem
The management (or military chain-of-command) of a test range is
responsible for its safety. The goal is to prevent personal injury and
property damage as a by-product of range activities in and out of the
range. In light of this goal, and remembering that absolute safety is an
unrealistic requirement, decisions should be made on whether or not
proposed test scenarios can be accepted. 5 The core of the problem is
thus the following question: Given the decision-maker's responsibility
toward the safety of the exposed population, how should decisions be
made? To be more specific, what risk acceptability criteria, if any,
should be applied in support of such a decision-making process?
The term "risk acceptability" merits elaboration. One does not
accept risk in isolation. One accepts options that entail some level of
risk. Whenever the decision-making process takes into account benefits
or other (non-risk) costs, the most acceptable option need not be the
one with the least risk. "Acceptable risk" can thus be referred to the risk
associated with the most acceptable option, or course of actions, in a
4 Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Fact and Fears:
Understanding Perceived Risk, in Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe is Safe
Enough? (R. C. Schwing & W. A. Albers, Jr., eds. 1980).
5 A test scenario is the combination of the investigated weapon system, the test
design, and the geographical and demographical setting.
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particular decision problem. 6 In our context, we assume that
performing the test will benefit the security of the relevant society to




1 No choice among options +
is possible
2 No selection among options +
is required
3 Predictability is important +
4 Regulators hope to shape +
future options
5 Competing technologies fall +
in the same jurisdiction
6 Category members are +
homogeneous
7 An explicit policy statement +
is attractive
8 Value issues are sensitive +
9 Political resources are limited +
10 Process is unimportant
11 Awkward applications can
be avoided
Commentc
Given geographical constraints, no other
operative option is available
Derived from #1
Tests are cornplicated and expensive;
decision has to be made much earlier than
date of operation
Decision policy should take into account
future changes in technologies and
population distribution
Almost all weapon tests are subject to the
Ministry of Defense decision criteria
Most tests relate to the family of aero-
explosive technologies
Explicit policy is ethically required given
security classification constraints
Dread, unfamiliarity, and lack of
knowledge are concerned
The Defense Community faces numerous
other hard decisions
Decision-making process is essentially
similar for all cases
Decision policy sometimes needs further
interpretation to meet this condition
a Condition for favoring standard-setting over a case-by-case decision process.
b + Condition is met; - condition is not met.
c Justification for suggested status.
Once the notion of "acceptable risk" is clear, one may question
when it makes sense to set and apply a structured set of criteria, as
opposed to a case-by-case decision process (using techniques such as
cost-benefit analysis or decision analysis). Fischhoff suggested a set of
eleven conditions that favor standard setting.8 By closely inspecting
6 Baruch Fischhoff et al. Acceptable Risk (1989); Baruch Fischhoff, Acceptable
Risk: A Conceptual Proposal, 5 Risk 1 (1994).
7 Adapted from Baruch Fischhoff, Setting Standards: A Systematic Approach to
Managing Public Health and Safety Risks, 30 Management Sci. 823 (1984).
8 Id.
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the case of weapon-system testing risks, and applying the principles of
his standard-setting discussion, it can be shown that the first ten
conditions are met (Table 1). In fact, by following a procedure to be
discussed later, the eleventh condition can be met too.9
One may add a twelfth condition: Standard setting is preferable in
the case of frequent rotation of decision-makers, when consistency is
required. Bearing in mind the high turnover rate of military personnel,
many of whom are intimately involved in the test approval process, this
condition is also clearly met.
The need for structured, quantitative risk acceptability criteria is not
unanimously agreed upon by the international weapon testing
community. For example, in its time the U.S. Range Commanders'
Council (RCC) promulgated the following risk management policy:10
Acceptable risk levels are not in general established. Risks are
minimized to the extent feasible and then, based upon
considerations of test objectives and national interest, the
tests are performed or rejected.
The RCC has not referred to the question "who defines the national
interest." It is therefore assumed that this is up to the local Range
Commander. Thus, one could find in the Safety Manual of a specific
test range the following application of the general policy stated above,
with regard to granting waivers: 1 1
A waiver [of safety policy] is granted [by the Commander,
PMTC]... if, in the judgment of the Commander, PMTC,
the risk involved is reasonable.
Recently, the policy has become more quantitative, 12 but the new
guidelines need further workout to serve as decision criteria.
The United Kingdom has adopted a qualitative criterion,
demanding "no significant foreseeable risk." One of the arguments for
adopting this policy is that, given a numerical safety standard to
achieve, the range user will select his or her assumptions and statistics to
meet this standard rather than aim for the safest trial possible. 13
9 Although the roots of our methodology go back to the 1970's, the issue of setting
structured criteria is best demonstrated by using Fischhoff's conditions from 1984.
10 Range Commanders' Council, Range Safety Group, White Sands Missile Range,
Risk Analysis Techniques, at 2.2. (Doc. 315-79, 1979).
11 D. M. Altwegg, PMTC Range Safety Handbook, 4 (1976).
12 J. R. Morrell, Eastern Range Regulation 127-1 - Range Safety (1993).
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Several other issues should be contemplated when considering
whether the case justifies specific decision criteria.
As stated above, weapon tests within small ranges impose risk on
unaware civilian population. Recent years' risk communication policies
in Western-type democratic societies call for public involvement in
decision-making, especially with regard to issues that relate to public
risk. Unfortunately, due to security reasons, such involvement is not
feasible in our case. 14 Structured acceptability criteria serve as a means
of compensation for the missing interaction between government and
the public, provided that they undergo a review process that is both
professional and conscientious, even though not open for public debate.
Also, the specific conditions of continuous military threat create, in
the case of the State of Israel, a balance of risk and benefit different
than that of other, more peaceful states and may justify some increase
of its risk-acceptability threshold. A Swiss colleague of the authors,
some years back said: "You're 'lucky'; you are in a state of permanent
war. Your standards may legitimately be more relaxed than ours."
Otway and Winterfeldt also suggest that a risk that might be
unacceptable in peacetime may be found acceptable in a wartime
defense industry. 15 In such circumstances, the enhanced imposed risk
emphasizes the need for a compensatory-structured decision tool.
Besides ethical considerations, public trust is an isssue. Trust is
known to be fragile and "asymmetric": it is created rather slowly, but
can be destroyed by a single mishap or mistake. This feature is
sometimes referred to as a "tilted playing field". 16 A severe conflict
may arise if, following an accident, the public is confronted with an
indefensible decision process on issues involving imposed risk.
Formulating structured risk acceptability criteria contributes to the
trust preservation by serving as a "one-sided contract" that the Defense
Community has with the public. The "contract" serves to ensure that no
arbitrary decisions are made by individual range commanders.
13 T. G. Wills, Range Safety, in Design for Safety (Royal Aero. Soc'y, 1991).
14 In fact, though seemingly foreign to democratic process, tight security by itself
may eventually save life.
15 Harry J. Otway & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Beyond Acceptable Risk: On the
Social Acceptability of Technologies, 14 Policy Sci. 247 (1982).
16 Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RiskAnal. 675 (1993).
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Finally, the population types exposed to risk also need
consideration. Different types (such as soldiers or civilians) are exposed
to different levels of risk during their day-to-day life. This state of
affairs is acceptable to society, at least implicitly. If a criterion based on
the background risk level of each exposed person is chosen, then these
differences should be taken into account.
The Tool
Given pros and cons, above, we have adopted a policy of applying
quantitative measures for go/no-go decisions related to proposed tests.
A tool that reflects two commonly-agreed risk components (personal
and group) has been developed. The first component, i.e., the risk to a
given person, is a function of the investigated system, the size of the
area that it can affect, and the presence of that person inside or outside
the affected area, regardless of the presence of other persons there. The
second component, i.e., the risk to society, depends (in addition to the
above) on the number and distribution of people in the relevant areas.
Thus, the decision tool is a set of benchmark number pairs. Each pair
consists of two figures - the maximum allowed Individual Risk (IR)
and the maximum allowed Societal Risk (SR):
0 The IR is the probability that a given member of the
exposed population becomes a fatality, due to weapon
testing in the range, over a given time period.
. The SR is the statistical expected number of fatalities
due to weapon testing, within the same population and over
the same time-period.
Each pair corresponds to a specific type of the exposed population:
* Nonparticipating, uninformed general population (GP);
* Nonparticipating, uninformed workers in industrial
facilities (W);
* Defense-community nonparticipating and uninformed
personnel (DN); and
* Defense-community personnel who are taking part in
the test and are informed about the risks (DI).
Determination of the maximum allowed IR is based on a "ripple
principle," stating the following:
The existing background risk level of any population is not a
constant. Rather, it is modulated by some ripple. Such a
ripple reflects statistical variations of the annual risk levels
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and also local fluctuations caused by governmental or
municipal decisions that are justified by the general public's
benefit. It is required that the integrated test-generated risk
increment, contributed to the existing background risk level
of a population by all the tests conducted over a given time-
period, will not raise the average risk level of the most
exposed members of that population beyond the ripple that
modulates its background risk anyway - by "most
exposed," we literally mean a very small group of people.
Given the ripple principle, the procedure by which the maximum
allowed IR was determined was:
* The level of risk to which the population of Israel is in
general exposed due to traffic accidents, industrial accidents
and accidents at home, was investigated. The average was
about 3 x 10-4 fatalities per person per year, while the
amplitude of its annual fluctuations throughout the recent
three decades was about 10-4 fatalities per person per year.
* The maximum allowed IR for the general public was set
to be one tenth of the ripple, i.e., 10-5 per person per year;
that of industrial workers was set as the ripple itself, i.e., 10-4
per person per year. As for the two other population types,
the risk to which they are voluntarily exposed is, by
definition, greater than that of the general public. Thus, on
ethical grounds, maximum allowed IRs of 2 x 10-4 and 10-3
were allocated for nonparticipating, uninformed defense-
community personnel and for defense-community
personnel participating in the test and informed about the
risks, respectively.
The value of 10-5, taken as a criterion for acceptable general public
IR, is generally consistent with published risk levels and criteria. For
example, Otway and Erdmann argued that while accidents having the
probability of the order of 10-6 per person per year are not of a great
concern to the average person, people do recognize risks at level of 10-5
per person per year, warn their children about them and may accept a
certain amount of inconvenience to avoid them. At an accident risk
level of 10-4 per person per year people are willing to spend money to
control the hazard. 17 Kletz stated that we seem to accept risks from
manmade events in the order of 10-7 per person per year for large
number of people. He suggests that the maximum risk of death to
17 Harry J. Orway & Robert C. Erdmann, Reactor Siting and Design from a Risk
Viewpoint, 13 Nuclear Eng. & Des. 365 (1970).
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which any individual is exposed should be fixed at 10-5 to 10-6 per
person per year. 18 Okrent and Whipple also proposed the risk level of
10-5 per person per year for the most exposed individual as an
acceptability criterion for activities that are "beneficial" to society,
going up to 10-4 for "essential" activities. 19 Specifically, Schneider
established a value of 10-5 per person per year as a tolerable death
probability for nonparticipating third parties in relation to explosive
operations.2 0 Bowen and Kaiser suggested similar values.2 1
Maximum allowed SR values were anchored on 5 x 10-5 annual
fatalities alloted for the general public. This was initially chosen as twice
the risk from meteorites (6 x 10-11 per person per year worldwide, i.e.,
2.4 x 10-5 fatalities per year for the relevant 4 x 105 members of the
general public exposed to test risks in Israel). 2 2 Yet, a structured
rationale for this number tries to ensure that when a large population is
exposed, the vast majority is exposed to only a very tiny fraction of
allowed IR levels. Thus, once the maximum allowed IR has been
dictated, the maximum allowed SR serves as a control to limit the
number of people exposed to high (though still allowed) levels of IR.
The lower the actual IR, the larger the allowed number of people
exposed.
This "exposed population limiting rationale" was considered so
useful by itself, that it acquired a semi-independent role in establishing
the allowed SR value. It was also compatible with our self-imposed
obligations in upholding the "one-sided contract" with the public on
the trust issue. Thus, the value indicated as a criterion was
approximately one order of magnitude lower than numerous SR
exposures in developed societies. It was ascertained that this strict goal
could indeed be met in practice, given relevant features of our problem.
18 Trevor A. Kletz, The Application of Hazard Analysis to Risks to the Public at
Large, in Chemical Engineering in a Changing World (W. T. Koetsier, ed. 1976).
19 David Okrent & Chris G. Whipple, An Approach to Societal Risk Acceptance
Criteria and Risk Management (1977).
20 T. Schneider, Some Principles for a Quantitative Approach to Safety Problems
in Explosive Storage and Manufacturing in Switzerland, in Minutes of the 17th DoD
Explosives Safety Seminar, Sept. 14-16, 1976, at 1445-1472.
21 John Bowen, The Choice of Criteria for Individual Risk, for Statistical Risks and
for Public Risk, in Risk-Benefit Methodology (D. Okrent, ed. 1975); G. D. Kaiser,
Overall Assessment, in High Risk Safety Technology 105 (A. G. Green, ed. 1982).
22 See supra note 18.
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A similar rationale, applied to industrial workers, set the maximum
allowed SR for this population at the 5 x 10-4 level.
Figure 223






100 101 102 10
3
Individual Risk
DI DN 1W GP
Ranking order of Population Sensitivity to Individual Risk
The two population types consisting of defense-community
personnel present a special feature. As mentioned, it is assumed that a
greater level of IR is tolerated by society for risks imposed on defense-
community members than for risks imposed on civilian populations.
Between the two defense-community groups, a higher risk is tolerated
for participating members, who are intimately and voluntarily involved
with the systems under test (DI), than for nonparticipating members
(DN). However, as a kind of compensation for the relatively high levels
of risks imposed on members of the test teams (DI), the allowed
number of exposed people is reduced compared to the nonparticipating
defense-community members. Figure 2 emphasizes this "tradeoff'
between IR and allowed "Number Exposed" levels for the defense-
23 GP: Nonparticipating, uninformed general population; IW: Nonparticipating,
uninformed workers in industrial facilities; DN: Defense-community
nonparticipating and uninformed personnel; and DI: Defense-community personnel
who are taking part in the test and are informed about the risks.
Feller & Maharile Risk Criteria for High-Performance Weapons 315
community populations. As explained above, the IR-SR method serves
as a tool for accomplishing this tradeoff.
The resulting values are in Table 2.24 These values of risk
acceptability criteria were approved by the Israeli MoD and are used in
the range. Decisions on the acceptability of proposed tests are made on
a per-test basis. The maximum risk levels permitted for a single test
depend on the annual number of tests to which a specific type of
population is exposed.
Table 2





1 GPa  10-5  5 x 10-5
2 IWb 10-4  5 x 10-4
3 DNc 2 x 10-4  2 x 10-2
4 DId 10-3  2 x 10-2
a Nonparticipating, uninformed general population.
b Nonparticipating, uninformed workers in industrial facilities.
c Defense-community nonparticipating and uninformed personnel.
d Defense-community personnel who are taking part in the test and are informed
about the risks.
Table 3 presents single-test acceptable risk levels, based on a set of
assumptions regarding the annual number of exposures to risk from
testing activities. Experience has shown that testing frequency decreases
with increasing system's sophistication and energy. Also, more
sophisticated and energetic systems result in larger kinematic envelopes.
Thus, the population that exists in the danger areas of such tests is
exposed to risk just few times yearly. The policy calls for rejecting risk
levels that correspond to less than ten tests per year, even in cases of
very infrequent operations.
24 Shaul Feller, Risks from Test-Ranges in Highly-Populated Environment (Rafael,
Haifa, Israel 1978) (in Hebrew); Shaul Feller, On Acceptable Risks and Field-Testing
(Rafael, Haifa, Israel 1985) (in Hebrew).
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A simplified procedure of decision-making, using those criteria, will
consist of the following three (or more) stages:
a Estimating the actual risk number pairs for the proposed
test scenario.
* Comparing this estimate with the benchmark values.
• Granting permission to go ahead if the actual pairs are
lower than (or equal to) the benchmark values, or, otherwise,
rejecting the proposed scenario and considering
modifications that may produce lower actual values.
Table 3
Single-Test Acceptable Risk Levels
Maximum Allowed
per Test of
Population Annual Number Individual Societal
# Type of Exposures Riska Risk
1 GPb 50 2 x 10-7  10-6
2 IWc  50 2 x 10-6  10-5
3 DNd 200 10-6 10-4
4 DIe  200 5 x 10-6 104
a Assuming a steady population in which the same individuals are exposed
throughout the year, i.e., individuals are "accumulating' risk.
b Nonparticipating, uninformed general population.
c Nonparticipating, uninformed workers in industrial facilities.
d Defense-community nonparticipating and uninformed personnel.
e Defense-community personnel who are taking part in the test and are informed
about the risks.
Applications
The following examples, all of which are taken from actual design
and operational activities in the test range, exhibit some of the possible
applications of the criteria described above.
Determination ofRisk/Population Parameters
Suppose that the risk is homogeneously distributed within the
kinematic envelope of the investigated system, i.e., the value of the
actual IR is a constant over the area enclosed by this envelope. If this
value is smaller than the benchmark IR (thus satisfying the first risk
acceptability condition), than the ratio (Benchmark SR / Actual IR)
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dictates the maximum permissible number of exposed people. For
example, if the actual levels of individual risks are the maximum
permitted, then the maximum permissible numbers of people exposed
are 5, 5, 100 and 20 for the four types of population, respectively (see
Table 2). As mentioned above, the lower the IR, the higher the
permissible number of people exposed: for example, if the maximum
IR in a single test is not larger than 10-9, than, under the assumption of
50 exposures per year, one can permit a presence of up to 1000 people
(general public) in the area.
Alternatively, if the number of people exposed to risk is given
(again, under the assumption of evenly-distributed risk). In this case,
the ratio (Benchmark SR / Number Exposed) dictates the maximum
permissible IR, as long as it is smaller than the benchmark IR.
More Complex Risk Distribution
In general, the risk throughout the kinematic footprint is not
uniform. Its distribution depends on the probabilities of possible
failures of the tested system, and their resulting behavior and
trajectories. Each specific failure (or type of failure) results in an impact
area that represents assembly and launch tolerances. The probability of
impact following such a failure is unevenly distributed within this
impact area, with the higher probability densities in its center. However,
for certain classes of failures (e.g., when a radar-seeking missile homes
on a false radiation source), the impact area may shrink into a single
point not necessarily at the center, where the whole probability of
impact is condensed. 2 5
A complete probabilistic risk assessment of a proposed weapon field
test thus comprises of the following:
• Collecting the relevant information in detail.
• Performing failure analysis of the investigated system
(with failure modes and their associated probabilities as
outcomes).
• Calculating trajectories following failures, i.e.,
trajectories deviating from the nominal test plan.
* Estimating impact areas resulting from failures.
• Projecting the proposed test geometry on the test arena,
and eliciting the test's kinematic envelope.
25 Although in this case the missile itself operates properly, such scenario should be
regarded as a failure of the test system as a whole.
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* Calculating IR and integrating SR levels throughout the
kinematic footprint of the tested system. For example, if
each zone corresponds to a single failure and vice versa, and
if the probability of hitting each zone following the
corresponding failure is evenly distributed throughout this
zone, then the calculation is performed as follows (the
equations refer to any single type of the exposed
population):
Ilj = Pf x Pi/f x (AK / Ai)
SR =I(IRi x Ni )
i
where:
IRi  - Individual Risk at zone hit by failure i;
Pf - Probability of the weapon system's failure;
Pi/f - Probability of failure i, given failure;
AKi - Mean Area of Effectiveness (MAE) following
failure i, given impact;
Ai  - Area of zone i;
SR - Societal Risk;
N i  - Size of population at area hit by failure i.
Decision-making: test approval, test rejection, or further
iterations until safety demands are met.
The Real World
In practice, the distribution of risk is even more complex than the
above example. A failure (or combination of failures) may occur at any
point along the designed trajectory; the impact probability distributions
resulting from failures are uneven; and, in addition, overlapping of
impact zones are common. To take all these features into account, one
must divide the kinematic footprint into "cells," and sum up, for each
cell, the contributions of all possible failures, occuring at any point
along the trajectory, that may lead to impact inside this cell. A detailed
description of this procedure is beyond the scope of this paper. Several
specific examples of such a procedure are described elsewhere.26
26 Shaul Feller & Michael Maharik, Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Weapon-
Systems Field-Testing: Accounting for System s Complexity and Unfamiliarity, in
Proceedings of PSAM-II - An International Conference on Probabilistic Safety
Assessment and Management (George E. Apostolakis & J. S. Wu, eds. 1994).
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Flight Termination System Reliability
The objective of flight termination is to prevent the tested object
from transgressing the boundaries of a pre-determined permitted flight
sector of the kinematic footprint, by "imposing conditions of zero lift,
yaw and thrust."27 There are several possible methods for terminating
a missile's free flight - cutting it into two or more aerodynamically-
unstable parts, ripping its rocket-motor open or activating its warhead
(provided one is installed). A Flight Termination System (FTS) greatly
reduces the risks imposed by the test but will never provide absolute
safety outside the pre-determined sector, due to its own possibility of
failure. The schematic description of the probabilistic safety aspect of
missile flight termination, shown in Figure 3, illustrates this point.
2 8
Suppose that in a proposed test scenario the actual SR is greater
than the benchmark SR, i.e., the integration of IRs gives (Actual SR) =
K x (Benchmark SR), K>1.
As it is, the test is unacceptable and should be rejected. Some
modification should thus be made in the test configuration. For
example, an FTS can be incorporated into the system under test. Risk
will still be imposed on people outside the permitted flight sector, but
now, referring again to the previous simplified model, one gets, for
every failure mode, Actual IRi = (1 - RFTS) x IR i, where RFTS is the
FTS reliability. Assuming that all the area within this sector is evacuated
so that it does not contribute to the risk, Actual SR = (1 - RFTS) x SR.
To reduce the actual SR to the permitted level, one must have 1 -
RFTS < (1 / K), i.e., RFTS > 1 - (1 / K). For example, if (Actual SR) /
(Benchmark SR) = 100, then one must have RFTS 0.99. In this way,
the set of risk acceptability criteria is used to define a quantitative
performance requirement actually applied in designing an engineering
safety device.
27 Air Force Systems Command, Armament Division, Range Safety (Reg. 127-1,
1984).
28 Adolf H. Knothe, Range Safety - A Necessary Evil, Aerospace Engineering,
June 1961, at 20-21, 70-76.
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Figure 329
Missile Flight Termination -A Schematic Probabilistic Description
a b c
PB NI)0 Pesc PB (r,W)
a No range safety action; impact is possible at any point within the
kinematic envelope. The impact probability density PB, however, will
vary with distance r from the launcher and azimuth deviation Vf from
the intended flight line.
b If range safety action were absolutely reliable, the impact probability
outside a given sector could be reduced to zero; inside, it would remain
unchanged. However, there would be an accumulation of impact
probabilities right along the boundary lines owing to the range safety
action taken on missiles that otherwise would have achieved impact
outside.
c Since range safety action cannot be absolutely reliable, there is a
chance Pesc that flight termination command remains without result; a
missile may thus escape the range safety action. Consequently, the
impact probability density outside the given sector will be as shown.
"Grey" Decision Zones
Risk acceptability criteria such as those suggested in Table 2 are
susceptible to criticism that they may lead to rejection of otherwise
attractive alternatives, whose risk levels are just beyond the threshold of
acceptability. 3 0 Such complaints arise especially when it is very
expensive (in terms of money or test data, the latter sometimes of
primary importance) to gain the small decrease in risk needed to
achieve compliance. Situations like this may create a temptation to
overstep the benchmark standard.
29 From Knothe, supra.
30 Stephen L. Derby & Ralph L. Keeny, Risk Analysis: Understanding "How Safe
is Safe Enough?" 1 Risk Anal. 217 (198 1).
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In our case, a "grey decision zone" is defined if the actual risk levels
are found exactly equal to the maximum permitted levels, or within
half an order of magnitude above. In such cases, the first thing to do is
to re-examine the assumptions at the base of the calculations (e.g.,
probability distributions of failures and impact areas, annual number of
exposures). From our experience, analysts tend to inject large, and
sometimes unnecessary, margins of safety, expecting that even with
these margins the results will meet the criteria with "room to spare." In
border cases like this, these "generous" margins should not be used, and
the assumptions should be defined as accurately as possible.
If, following this re-examination, one still finds himself in the "grey
decision zone," our policy is to re-evaluate the risk-benefit balance of
the proposed test and approve or reject the test accordingly. This re-
evaluation should only be performed by a higher authority that does
not belong to the test establishment.
On the face of it, this policy may seem to serve as a mechanism for
carrying out tests that should, by right, have been rejected.
Nevertheless, the reader should bear in mind that the core of the matter
is not risk per-se but a balance between risk and benefit. The reader
should also remember that, in this context, the benefit is preservation of
human life. Thus, one deals with a risk-risk balance. 3 1 When these
risks and "benefits" are very evenly balanced, the problem deserves a
further evaluation. As mentioned above, the mandate for the evaluation
and resulting decision is transferred to higher authorities. 32
Past Experience
Comparison of the risk acceptability thresholds discussed above
with experience gained during two decades of weapon testing activity
produces the following observations:
0 IR levels in inhabited, or temporarily occupied, areas
within the kinematic envelope were always found to be at
least one order of magnitude below the maximum
permitted level.
31 Lester B. Lave, Health and Safety Risk Analyses: Information for Better
Decisions, 236 Science 291 (1987).
32 This procedure contributes toward the removal of awkwardness from cases
located in the "grey decision zones," and thus to meeting Fischhoff's eleventh
condition for favoring standard-setting (see Table 1).
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a SR levels for each of the defense-community population
categories have never been anywhere near the maximum
permitted levels. In fact, given the calculated IRs, one could
accept the presence of a much higher number of people -
up to several orders of magnitude - than actually present
within the kinematic envelope. This margin reflects the
relatively high benchmark SR allocated to those populations.
* Yet, when considering risks imposed on civilian
populations, the actual SR tevels were sometimes found to
be inconveniently close to the benchmark numbers. For
instance, SR levels of 10-6, 1.5x10- 6, 8x10- 6 , and even
1.5x10-5 fatalities per test were obtained in some specific
cases, as compared to the permissible 5x10-6 level per test
(assuming a frequency of ten tests per year).
In some border cases, the test design was changed to meet the
requirements. In others, the "grey decision zone" procedure was
applied, and the decision was referred to a higher management
authority. However, even though the discussed tests were approved and
successfully performed, the inconvenience associated with small
difference between the actual SR and the benchmark SR has remained
on the agenda. This inherent grain of inconvenience is unavoidable. In
fact, it serves as an ethical safeguard, by preventing the decision-makers
from becoming too complacent.
As for the uncertainties associated with the actual risk values: The
estimated basic probability of the weapon system's failure (Pf, see
above) was based on many years' statistics of missile testing in the U.S.
We adopted this probability value, although our experience produced a
significantly lower number. In the next step, the uncertainties associated
with the models and conditional probabilities were estimated, and the
sensitivity of the resulting risks to these uncertainties was assessed. It
was found that once the choice of a Pf value was made, the outcome
was very insensitive to both model and conditional probabilities
uncertainties: less than half an order of magnitude altogether.
Choosing, as we did, a conservative SR value, and given our
demonstrated weapon systems' failure frequency, we concluded that
our criteria do indeed address the issue of possible uncertainties.
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Enlarging the Picture
When dealing with a probabilistic risk assessment one must bear in
mind what may be called the "Engineering-Probability Principle"
(EPP):
It is legitimate to rely on probabilistic arguments, estimates,
and criteria, only when all that is "engineeringwise" feasible
and reasonable has indeed been introduced into the
investigated system and test design to prevent failure and/or
mitigate its outcome.
A strict adherence to this principle is an essential condition of the
"one-sided" contract that the Defense Community has with the public,
given the existing security classification constraints. In a way, it also
serves as a safeguard against a possible tendency, mentioned above, to
manipulate statistics to meet numerical standards. 33 The following are
several applications of the EPP:
; Typically, the danger areas of most proposed tests can
be divided into two zones: a relatively small central zone
and a large peripheral one. Probability of impact is
concentrated in the former, while the rest of it is sparsely
distributed in the latter. The EPP forbids the presence of
nonparticipating personnel in the central zone even if
probabilistically acceptable. Thus, the central impact zone is
always totally evacuated from nonparticipating personnel.
0 Prior to a large-scale test, one must always verify that
there is no singular concentration of people within the
potential impact area, e.g., a central sporting or
entertainment event. This contributes toward preventing
multi-fatality accidents even when the statistical expected
value of fatalities is formally acceptable. In this way, even
though the existing set of criteria does not explicitly relate
to catastrophic events, the EPP serves as an informal tool for
reduction of the probabilities of such events.
* Even when the weapon system kinematic envelope
exceeds the test range boundaries, both IR and SR
probabilistic criteria are sometimes met with "room to
spare," e.g., in the case of air-to-air missiles with inert
warheads tested over a sparsely populated desert. However,
following the EPP, a mandatory FTS is required whenever
the kinematic envelope is not fully contained within the test
range boundaries.
33 See supra note 13.
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* Separation of hazard variables is highly recommended.
Dynamic weapon tests that must include a live warhead
(e.g., when the goal of the test is investigating terminal
effects) are to be designed with as short a range as possible.
Weapon tests that are planned for maximum range (e.g.,
when system aerodynamic performance is investigated) are
to be designed with an inert warhead.
Other engineering tools that back the use of probabilistic
considerations are detailed elsewhere. 34
Closure
Measuring and valuing risk is multifaceted; research in this area is
dynamic, and concepts are introduced continuously. Against this
background, a workable tool that compresses the essential topics of risk
analysis and management into a set of test range risk acceptability
criteria has been developed and implemented. This tool is the basis of a
structured decision-making process, is useful even in extreme, complex
situations, and is adaptable to risk management developments. In spite
of its compressed nature, this tool also addresses the variety of social
complexities and perceptions in reaction to the use of technology, as
well as to the profile of the specific society which it is meant to serve.3 5
This ethically-based approach contributes to preserving the credibility
of involved institutions, and thus to public trust in them - a measure
of primary importance in public acceptance of technology.36
34 Michael Maharik, Safety Design of High-Performance Weapon Testing (Rafael,
Haifa, Israel 1986) (in Hebrew).
35 Brian Wynne, Risk and Social Learning: Reification to Engagement, in Social
Theories of Risk (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding, eds. 1992).
36 Harry J. Otway, Public Wisdom, Expert Fallibility: Toward a Contextual
Theoy ofRisk, in Social Theories of Risk, supra.
